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ABSTRACT
Organisational perspectives propose that structural arrangements aﬀect policy
outcomes. Drawing on these perspectives, it is worthwhile to ﬁnd out whether
and how disagreements among public authorities create barriers to public
sector adaptation and preparedness. As the literature on weather vulnerabil-
ities and climate adaptation recommends increased public sector coordina-
tion, exploring the possibilities of governance can contribute to the
improvement of lifeline conditions. Insights from a Norwegian case study
suggest that the diﬀerent mandates of responsible public authorities some-
times clash. Such clashes limit the abilities to sustain welfare and business
conditions when avalanches and blizzards cause highway outages. The ﬁnd-
ings also show that governance might only partly improve public sector peril
response measures, as there is rarely suﬃcient ﬂexibility to consider speciﬁc
interests or preferences, for example, to keep a highway open until a school
bus or a freight delivery has passed.
KEYWORDS Adaptation; governance; multi-level system; preparedness; public administration; natural
hazard
Introduction
Communities around the world are vulnerable to sudden lifeline cut-oﬀs
caused by natural hazards. Such problems are becoming increasingly ser-
ious, given climate change and the advance of the 24/7 society that expects
and requires unrestricted road access. Public authorities grapple with how
to sustain or improve the quality of life, health, welfare and livelihoods
following these cut-oﬀs.
In this complex world, authorities disagree on how best to delineate
multifaceted climate-induced dilemmas that threaten people’s welfare and
business conditions. Yet in public administration, coordination across policy
sectors and levels of governments has gained increased importance (Peters
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2015a). Although departments tend to operate in silos (i.e., they do not
share information or work together), policy problems such as climate
change and weather-induced challenges transcend organisational bound-
aries, administrative levels and sectors (Lægreid and Rykkja 2014).
Against this background, we ask whether organisational silos create
obstacles for public authorities when trying to solve preparedness and
adaptation problems related to natural hazards. Do diﬀerences among
these authorities create barriers to public sector adaptation and prepared-
ness? If so, could the public authorities contribute to improving welfare and
business conditions, if they increased their coordination (i.e., changed their
governance structures) when responding to disruptions caused by natural
hazards?
Drawing on organisational and governance approaches, we explore the
relationships between public authorities with responsibilities for winter
climate-induced highway closures in Troms County in northern Norway.
This region is interesting, since several of its communities are prone to
being disconnected from the outside world through road closures, electri-
city outages and telecommunication outages.
We describe the responsibilities of authorities and elucidate upon the
diﬃculties of resolving problems with local preparedness and adaptation
caused by winter climate-induced highway closures. We also investigate
whether modiﬁed governance structures may contribute to mitigating the
drawbacks of cut-oﬀs of lifelines: physical networks that are vital to the
health, safety, comfort, and livelihoods of a community (Platt 1991).
This investigation is relevant for several reasons. Empirically, it is timely
for decision-makers to pay more attention to winter climate-induced perils
and related uncertainty problems (Lawrence 2015), particularly in multi-
layered institutional contexts with signiﬁcant decentralisation like
Norway’s (Hollis and Ekengren 2013). Several preparedness studies indicate
deﬁcient policy guidance and limited coordination among levels of public
administration (Fimreite, Lægreid, and Rykkja 2014; Høydal 2007); there is
also a lack of in-depth understanding of sub-national policy-making, or of
the ways in which institutional procedures work when nature’s forces
strike. There is also a lack of studies of the problems bedevilling public
authorities at various levels and sectors in aﬄuent societies, speciﬁcally the
perils of sudden winter climate-induced highway closures. These issues are
not only interesting in their own right, they are also vital to people’s lives
since local preparedness and adaptation contribute to the security of a
society (Baker et al. 2012; Wilson 2006) and the upkeep of business
conditions.
A vast body of literature has proposed government reform and ‘good
governance’ as solutions to societal issues (Leftwich 1993). Brooks, Adger,
and Kelly (2005) maintain that adaptive capacity to natural disaster events
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and climate-induced calamities is largely associated with governance.
Adaptation encompasses various actions to protect people, conducted by
individuals, groups, governments and public bodies – mostly within hierarch-
ical structures and the constraints of institutional processes (Adger, Arnell, and
Tompkins 2005). Among the barriers to adaptation are failure in collective
decision-making and ambiguity over who is responsible for action (Tompkins
and Adger 2005). Adger, O’Brien, and Lorenzoni (2009) underline that climate-
related adaptation is a multi-scalar process of multi-level governance from the
bottom up and from the top down. Thus, increased coordination across
public sector agencies and levels may help to solve severe multi-faceted
problems triggered by nature’s forces. Such assumptions have guided exten-
sive research on the adaptation and preparedness related to natural hazard
events and climate issues (Biesbroek et al. 2013, 2014). Implicit is often an
optimistic comprehension that if governance issues are resolved, then natural
disaster preparedness and adaptation capacity will improve. However, the
unpredictability of natural hazard incidents indicates that this may be a
disputed ﬁeld of governance (Zurita et al. 2015).
While the selected case does not represent a change in the governance
structure, investigating perceptions and current barriers do provide insight
into whether improved governance may contribute to solve these problems.
It should be added that while multi-level and other types of governance
research often include civil society, the present study concentrates on public
authorities, agencies and their contractors, as civil society in the study areas
has extensive experience in the short-term adaptation to road closures
(Jacobsen, Leiren, and Saarinen 2016).
In the following, we present the organisational and governance perspec-
tives and delineate our expectations before presenting the methods. In the
empirical section, we describe the formal responsibilities, perceptions and
mandates of public authorities, as well as their work related to local security,
natural disaster preparedness and protection against avalanches and bliz-
zards. Finally, we discuss the evidence in light of the organisational per-
spectives and governance theory, explaining how diﬀerent roles and
responsibilities result in disagreement among public authorities in terms
of how to sustain welfare and business conditions during adverse natural
events. The article concludes with some general thoughts about natural
hazards as public authority challenges.
Organisational and governance perspectives
Climate adaptation researchers call for increased coordination across actors
and levels, arguing that neither local nor upper management works well by
themselves (Berkes 2009). Biesbroek et al. (2013) claim that practitioners
tend to believe in abilities to solve problems. As a result, there is a lack of
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analytical frameworks that guide the realist and pessimist types of barrier
examination to climate-related adaptation. A realist perspective sees many
societal challenges as wicked, a pessimist perspective assumes that govern-
ment contributions to solving climate-induced problems are only minor
(Biesbroek et al. 2014). By focusing on the ability of public authorities to
restore lifelines to the outside world or problems that are related to cut-oﬀs
from the outside world, we draw on organisational and governance
perspectives.
Organisational perspectives
The organisational perspective in institutional theory is useful for under-
standing how administrations handle natural hazards. As known from clas-
sics in the literature on public administration (March and Olsen 1989),
structural arrangements at various administrative levels and how they relate
to each other aﬀect policy outcomes. The delegation of responsibilities
determines the topics that reach the agenda, the topics that are seen in
juxtaposition, and that topics that are ignored (Cohen, March, and Olsen
1972). Moreover, organisational settings may shape public decisions, as
organisational aﬃliations typically inform policy content and aﬀect staﬀ
thinking and behaviour (Egeberg 2003).
Organisational arrangements create borders that focus decision makers’
attention and help them to comprehend a complex reality (Egeberg
2003). Hence, the locations of responsibilities for various policy areas are
important (i.e., portfolios in diﬀerent sectors or political and administra-
tive levels). Departments tend to operate in silos. They can be ambitious
about joint policy development and horizontal coordination, both of
which often face a range of barriers in practice. This is known in general
(Peters 2015a), and in relation to preparedness and climate adaptation
(Forino et al. 2017). For example, local planners who have key prepared-
ness and planning responsibilities, may only have a ‘superﬁcial under-
standing’ of how to implement sustainability objectives (Berke and
Conroy 2000); and local authorities tend to lack the competence and
plans to resolve climate-induced hazards (Amundsen, Berglund, and
Westskog 2010). Lower administrative levels are inclined to wait for
instructions, information and measures from above (Ryghaug and Solli
2012) while national and sectoral authorities do not suﬃciently take into
account the diﬀerent local contexts (Westskog, Hovelsrud, and Sundqvist
2017). In many cases, adaptation planning does not suﬃciently contribute
to local societal security (Baker et al. 2012; Wilson 2006). Based on such
insights, our ﬁrst expectation is that organisational silos or disparities
among the responsible public authorities create barriers to problem
solving.
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Governance approaches
In most European societies, public administration has traditionally solved
social problems in a sectoral and hierarchical manner (Kettl 2015): authority
emanates from the top and orders are passed down the line (Pollitt and
Bouckaert 2004). However, in the twenty-ﬁrst century the state alone cannot
solve many complex societal problems (Meuleman 2008), by its orders or by
‘rule of law’ (Benson 2009). To understand natural hazards and other envir-
onmental problems, researchers have proposed a variety of governance
modes (e.g., markets, networks, top–down approaches).
‘Governance’ refers to new governing processes (Rhodes 1996, 1997) and
how governments act (Kettl 2015). Network governance has become most
commonly associated with the idea of governance; for example inter-orga-
nisational networks that bring together governing bodies and cooperating
organisations to solve public problems (Sørensen and Torﬁng 2005, 2009).
As such, policy networks reﬂect stable social relationships among interde-
pendent actors, coalescing around policy problems and/or programmes
(Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997).
‘Multi-level governance’ has insights that are beneﬁcial for political sys-
tems with several tiers of authority (Marks 1992). As a framework, it provides
an understanding of policies at a higher political level, as a result of the
continual international, national, regional and local coordination. Overlap
and interdependence characterise the relationships between these levels
(Hooghe and Marks 2001). Multi-level governance has a horizontal dimen-
sion, when actors at diﬀerent political levels meet to agree on policies
(Hooghe and Marks 2001). It also has a hierarchical dimension, where
constant top–down coordination results in interventions at lower levels
from a higher-level authority (Egeberg 2006). Examples include situations
when a higher authority organises courses for civil servants, imposing rules
on how lower-level tasks should be performed. The hierarchical approach
challenges self-control at the lower levels.
While the hierarchical multi-level approach may contribute to under-
standing decisions at the sub-national level, the key intention of multi-
level governance is to bring sub-national actors into the understanding of
policy development at higher political levels (Piattoni 2009). For local
responsibility studies (i.e., social adaptation and preparedness to natural
hazard events), meta-governance is more widespread than multi-level gov-
ernance. This is because meta-governance is concerned with the inﬂuence
of higher political levels on policy processes that have been delegated to
lower political levels. ‘Meta-governance’ means ‘coordinating diﬀerent forms
of governance and ensuring a minimal coherence among them’ (Jessop
1997, 7). It depicts formal public organisations’ need to retain some control
over decentralised decision-making organisations (Meuleman 2011).
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Recognising that there are limits to the vertical hierarchical power as well as
to horizontal regimes of self-coordination (Whitehead 2003), meta-govern-
ance highlights practices and procedures that contribute to secure govern-
mental inﬂuence (i.e., command and control) in matters that lower political
levels are responsible for (Amore and Hall 2016). It also encompasses the
state’s attempts to steer actors in particular directions (Sørensen 2006), for
example when higher-level management supervises local authorities, where
the latter has the key responsibility in climate adaptation.
While our ﬁrst expectation proposes that the typical portfolio approach
creates barriers to problem solving, adaptation researchers see governance
as a way to resolve such issues. In the transport sector, where responsibil-
ities are fragmented, strengthened coordination across levels and between
departments and agencies seems to be rational and helps to steer through
chaotic situations (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Peters 2015b).
It could also be expected that the involvement of higher levels via meta-
governance improves preparedness and adaptation, as the key level respon-
sible for adaptation policy, the local level, is often criticised for having weak
adaptation competence (Amundsen, Berglund, and Westskog 2010). Our
second expectation is therefore that increased coordination via meta-govern-
ance will make public authorities better at handling conditions caused by
natural hazards. As our case does not represent altered meta-governance
structures, we respond to this second expectation based on the investiga-
tions of informants’ perceptions.
Methods
To understand public sector multi-level meta-governance related to winter
climate-induced road perils, a study of a region is relevant, as it involves a
range of public authorities and agencies at diﬀerent levels with a variety of
responsibilities. We focus on Troms County (Norway), which encompasses
several communities that are prone to sudden highway closures caused by
avalanches, heavy snowfalls and strong winds.
The data are primarily qualitative and include written documentation
about formal responsibilities and oral data from nine interviews and two
workshops. Informants were chosen for the purpose of integrating perspec-
tives from a range of administrative levels and from relevant actors who are
not part of government administrations. We selected informants from two
municipalities to incorporate viewpoints from two local administrations:
Tromsø, including the biggest city in Troms in terms of population, and
Berg, a small municipality. Both areas are exposed to winter climate-induced
highway closures. All informants remain anonymous.
The ﬁrst four interviews were carried out on 4–5 February 2015 in the
small community of Senjahopen, which experiences highway closures nearly
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every winter. The informants were three members of the ambulance service
(Interview 5), two employees of a freight company (Interview 6), one politi-
cian (Interview 7) and one snow truck driver (Interview 8). Four telephone
interviews were completed in April 2015 with civil servants from Tromsø
(Interview 1), the Norwegian Public Roads Administration, Region North
(Interview 2), the County Governor’s Oﬃce in Troms (Interview 3) and the
Berg municipality (Interview 4). One additional interview with a business
manager in Senjahopen was conducted on 7 August 2017 (Interview 9).
Informants in Interviews 1–4, including three representatives from the
regional administration, the county of Troms, participated in two workshops
in Tromsø. Workshop 1 met on 2 February 2015 and Workshop 2 on 30
March 2017. The workshops were semi-structured, like the interviews, but
open for group discussions. The sample size is a consequence of the number
of authorities and agencies involved. These are small organisations. Hence,
the study was limited to the most important staﬀ. The sample is large
enough to answer the research questions (Marshall 1996).
Resolving local preparedness and adaptation problems in Troms
In Norway, public authorities’ responsibilities are organised in accordance
with the sector principle, with municipalities and counties being indepen-
dent. Despite the delegation of responsibilities, the state often wants to
inﬂuence decisions (Sørensen 2006). This also happens in Norway’s road
sector (Leiren, Krogstad, and Longva 2015). Moreover, cooperation is deﬁ-
cient within the transport sector (Tennøy 2012). Even at the same adminis-
trative level, portfolios related to the transport sector are typically located in
diﬀerent departments (Leiren, Krogstad, and Longva 2015). In this section,
we summarise the key responsibilities of the most important local, regional
and national actors. We also describe their experiences, perceptions, chal-
lenges and mandates.
Formal responsibilities
The road sector involves cooperation among national, regional and local actors
(Figure 1). Actors at the national level supervise, coordinate and monitor local
preparedness and security responsibilities. The County Governor’s Oﬃce, the
regional representative of the national state, supervises local tasks. It trains
municipality staﬀ (the Instructions of the County Governor’s Oﬃce from 2008).
In major emergencies, the County Governor’s Oﬃce may be tasked with crisis
coordination, to ensure that the situation is eﬀectively handled with a clear
division of responsibilities and suﬃcient competence at all administrative
levels. The County Governor’s Oﬃce focuses on preparedness, holistic risk
and vulnerability analyses. The County Governor’s Oﬃce may object to local
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or county plans to ensure that civil protection is properly considered. This is
sometimes controversial, as the Plan and Building Act is unclear, as it includes
both ‘can’ and ‘should’ formulations.
At the regional level, the County is important, because of its role as a road
owner, public transport authority and regional risk planner. Its competences
are in the hands of two departments: the planning department, which
revises the regional risk and vulnerability plans, and the transport depart-
ment, which provides public transport services and road services and invest-
ments. As the largest road owners in Norway, the counties rely on the
expertise of the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (hereafter: Roads
Administration) to plan, estimate road projects, and procure maintenance
and investment contracts. On behalf of the County, the Roads
Administration decides whether a highway should be closed at times of
heightened avalanche risks or (impending) extreme weather (e.g., blizzards,
heavy snowfall). The Roads Administration also carries out public procure-
ments for the County, granting the rights for entrepreneurs to compete for
road maintenance and investment contracts. The Roads Administration
monitors entrepreneurial performance to ensure compliance with the con-
tracts. It delegates entrepreneurs to assess avalanche and blizzard risks but
makes the ﬁnal decisions on highway closures and openings. This sectoral
authority has, like the police, the authority to close a road and direct traﬃc
(Road Traﬃc Act § 7). The Roads Administration has a responsibility to know
Figure 1. Overview of relations between key public authorities and their roles in cases
of Norwegian regional highway closures (NGO: non-governmental organization).
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the road and roadwork risks, threats and vulnerabilities and is obliged to
work cross-sectorally with emergency planning (Directorate of Public Roads
2015). It is also responsible for ensuring preparedness to safeguard the best
possible accessibility on the main road networks under various strains. The
Roads Administration includes six regional authorities; the Northern Region
is the relevant subdivision for this investigation.
The primary responsibility for work related to preparedness and adaptation
lies at the local level. This is in line with the Norwegian proximity principle,
according to which crises should be handled at the lowest possible organisa-
tional level. The Civil Protection Act confers upon the municipality the primary
responsibility to respond to any peacetime emergency. The Act requires the
municipality to undertake civil emergency preparations to safeguard the con-
tinuation of key social services, including local infrastructure, health services,
elderly care and public information. The municipalities are obliged to root
societal security in all planning and budget processes. Important tools include
local planning (under the Plan and Building Act), risk and vulnerability analysis
and local crisis management plans. Every municipality is legally required to
have a local preparedness plan, which is its operative plan for crisis and
catastrophe management. It should be revised annually. Training, in line with
the preparedness plan, should be carried out every second year.
Various perceptions of road closures
Closing a highway causes numerous problems. Residents of areas with frequent
and sudden road closures express worries about their life and well-being (e.g.,
fatal road accidents; not being able to get to and from appointments with
health services and medical practitioners), livelihood (e.g., income losses for
businesses as goods cannot be transported; employees hindered from getting
to and fromwork) andwelfare (e.g., running errands, transporting children to or
from school, receiving visits from relatives and friends). These are also concerns
of municipalities. Moreover, there are concerns that municipalities will not
appeal to prospective residents or businesses (Interview 1; 4).
When a highway is closed, the foremost concern of the municipality is
the protection of public services (e.g., education, health, and technical
services) in the best possible way (Interview 1, 4). Kindergartens and schools
have their own procedures for pupils and parents when, for example, an
access road is (or likely to be) closed. The municipality ensures the necessary
help and medical care at both sides of a road closing. When the weather
forecast and snow observations indicate likely highway closures, the muni-
cipality must ensure alternatives to critical services (Interview 1).
Citizen and business transportation needs require the municipalities to
request improved information and more ﬂexibility related to highway closures,
pertaining to common disputes about when and how often highways should
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be closed, closure durations and the dissemination of information. The munici-
palities wish to be able to provide citizens and enterprises with advance
information about a road closure. In that way, people might be able to enter
or leave an area while the road is still open (Workshop 1). Along the same lines,
industrial interests highlight the need for early information about closure:
‘When a company is not able to deliver its goods, the buyer looks for another
supplier and the contract may be lost forever’ (Interview 5). A highway closure
may have huge ripple eﬀects for industries. For instance, ﬁsh processing plants
and transport companiesmay lose contracts when a highway is closed, because
they are not able to make a delivery on time (Interview 9).
The informant from the Roads Administration conﬁrms that there is
pressure not to close highways that are vulnerable to avalanches. This
person disagrees with the demand that the Roads Administration
should provide advanced information about when it will close highways.
There is no way that we will close [the road] in one hour, just to let the school
bus through. No, we can’t wait to close the road and [because of the risk]
there is no way that we would let a school bus drive through. We don’t allow
ourselves to be pushed [to do that]. (Interview 2)
On the one hand, there is a perception that it is possible to oﬀer suﬃcient
warning about avalanches. On the other hand, sudden risks may occur. The
role of the Roads Administration is to close the highway at times of heigh-
tened avalanche or blizzard risk. This is a question of probability: ‘The problem
is to know how certain you should be that an avalanche might be triggered
before you close [the road]. Often, avalanches strike without the road barrier
being closed’ (Interview 2). Weather changes quickly. A road may seem safe
but suddenly the wind turns. The Roads Administration argues that they
would often be crying wolf if they were to provide information about immi-
nent road closures before they close. The Roads Administration does not see
how it could make such warnings safe (Interview 2).
While the Roads Administration does not release information about when
it will close a road, a former subcontractor (i.e., the snow plough company
that also provided risk assessment data to the Roads Administration) used to
inform businesses, the school and the commuters when a road was likely to
be closed (Interview 5). A new subcontractor did not (Interview 8). On
certain stretches of road, snow trucks would clear most of the road, even
when it had been closed for general passage (Interview 4). In this way, the
road was ready for traﬃc as soon as the barrier was lifted, reducing the
amount of time that the road was closed.
When roads are not cleared frequently, there might be too much snow
for a plough to get through. Therefore, the use of heavier equipment may
be necessary (Interview 5; 8). The new subcontractor had less road main-
tenance and risk assessment experience than the previous subcontract tor
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(Interview 8). In addition, the staﬀ had issues with the ﬂeet (Interview 7; 8). A
consequence was that the highway remained blocked for a longer time than
residents considered acceptable (Interview 7).
This has sometimes resulted in intimidation of plough drivers, by resi-
dents demanding where the snow truck was (Interview 8). The Roads
Administration contends, ‘We have lost people with local knowledge
because the community has bothered them so much’ (Interview 2). This is
related to the competitive tendering processes, as there has been local
dissatisfaction over changes in road maintenance companies, due to uncer-
tainty about their expertise and equipment.
Diﬀerent mandates
The authorities and agencies have diﬀerent mandates that are important for
the understanding of highway closures. The municipalities have several
social and economic responsibilities. In contrast, the Roads Administration
is solely responsible for highway safety and accident prevention. The infor-
mant from the Roads Administration states that it is good that their orga-
nisation does not have any additional responsibilities: ‘We cannot consider
heart attacks or whether someone is about to give birth. If we should
consider that there must be transport, then it would be [an] impossible
[task]. We do not have that social responsibility. (Interview 2)’
Similarly, an ambulance driver opined that, ‘It’s good someone else has the
responsibility to close the road. I would have driven, nomatter what the weather
was like’ (Interview 5). Hence, the driver suggests that fatal road accidents could
have happened if the ambulance service had decided to brave a dangerous road.
Informants also propose that the diﬀerent perspectives are partly related to
costs: ‘The municipalities’ economy is poor. It’s not easy to provide alternative
transport [when the roads are closed]’ (Interview 2). Along these lines, a
representative of one of the municipalities argues, ‘The police make decisions
about evacuations. [. . .] It is very good that this does not end up being an issue
for municipal assessments, based on the economy’ (Interview 1). If it was, it may
have been much harder to make evacuation decisions. These opinions suggest
that given the limited resources, decisions to close a highway or to evacuate
might have been diﬀerent if the public authorities responsible for covering the
costs were also the ones that made the decisions, as evacuation and alternative
transport are expensive.
The municipality may order alternative transport from the public trans-
port authority, which is part of the county. The county may, for example,
make a passenger vessel available when a road is closed. Small municipa-
lities can rarely aﬀord to arrange for extraordinary services (Interview 4);
however, the County Governor’s Oﬃce has discretionary funds to which
municipalities may apply to cover their costs.
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Local security and preparedness planning and competence
While municipalities experience that authorities at higher levels do not
consider societal needs when closing a highway, those authorities point
out diﬃculties with local preparedness planning and competence. In many
municipalities, preparedness depends on a few key staﬀ (e.g., in the admin-
istration), and their possible experience with serious weather events
(Interview 3). Several municipalities do not document their work but they
may still be good at sharing experiences and norms within their organisa-
tion. However, the law requires documentation, as this is supposed to
protect the municipality. The municipalities are obliged to write reports
and deﬁne their needs in planning and preparedness systems.
Informants at the regional level opine that some municipalities do not
fully understand their preparedness responsibilities. It seems that many
municipalities have not realised how serious the weather hazards might
be and therefore have not integrated the need for preparedness planning
and crisis management (Workshop 2). However, municipalities that have a
comprehensive Risk and Vulnerability Analysis may still struggle to imple-
ment their plan, directing their expectations towards other service providers
(e.g., the Roads Authorities) that are expected to ‘tidy up’ (Workshop 2).
The system does not work as well as it could, due to the diﬀerent roles of
the public authorities (informant in Workshop 2). One example is the
county’s regional Risk and Vulnerability Analysis, which explains what
needs to be done during major hazards. Major hazards are diﬀerent from
small hazards in terms of how long a road remains closed. When the hazards
are minor, the responsibility for responding is assigned on a case-by-case
basis. The municipalities are responsible for analysing the situation and
inviting the county to participate. The county does not react until it has
been contacted by the municipalities, for example, to provide a passenger
vessel when an access highway is closed.
Moreover, the county has extensive planning responsibilities but it can be
reluctant to exert those responsibilities in order to avoid being perceived as
superior to the municipality. Informants argue that if the County shows
reluctance to be a supervisor, it does not deserve its planning responsibility.
In interviews, the representative of the County Governor’s Oﬃce
observed that a good plan involves politicians and is cross-sectoral
(Interview 3). However, in some municipalities the responsibility for prepa-
redness is in the hands of the chief ﬁre oﬃcer. This oﬃcer may not have the
cross-sectoral overview that a planner is expected to have (Interview 3).
Furthermore, ‘politicians are uncertain as to whether [statements in plans]
decrease their ability to act as it gives stronger municipal plans which may
restrict other ideas’ (Interview 3). This means that politicians might ﬁnd
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plans limiting rather than enabling, as plans tend to draw attention to what
is in the plan, while limiting the possibility to beneﬁt from other ideas.
According to the County Governor’s Oﬃce, local security and prepared-
ness planning problems are usually more serious in small municipalities than
in larger ones. One problem is a lack of capacity: ‘Small municipalities have
poor plans, bad and weak holistic risk and vulnerability analyses. It’s a
problem to get them implemented. We believe it is about resources and
competence’ (Interview 3). One informant in the small municipality of Berg
conﬁrms that a lack of resources is a problem: ‘We do not have anyone with
professional expertise in this ﬁeld’ (Interview 4). As a result, the County
Governor’s Oﬃce is more frequently in contact with the smaller municipa-
lities than with the larger ones. While the smaller municipalities lean on the
County Governor’s Oﬃce for counselling, the larger ones do not need that
kind of support (Interview 1; 3). Resource constraints increase the impor-
tance of volunteer work by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as
the Red Cross, which have their own preparedness plans (Interview 5).
Avalanche safeguarding and surveillance
While diﬀerent authorities are doing their best to meet local needs, what
residents really want is open and safer roads. However, informants at
diﬀerent levels insist that building snow sheds, avalanche galleries and
tunnels is expensive. They ask the political question of how good prepared-
ness should be in Norway and whether it is realistic to resolve natural
hazards with infrastructure measures (Workshop 2). More speciﬁcally, should
public authorities spend millions on road improvements and safeguarding
in districts characterised by depopulation even when there are many thriv-
ing businesses in those areas? Moreover, even with avalanche safeguarding,
the roads are not fully safe. A tunnel does not guarantee road safety, as
climate change may cause avalanches elsewhere.
Some informants suggest that technology may be a preferable solution to
road infrastructure (Workshop 2). Newmonitoring and prevention technologies
(e.g., snow radars, drones, shooting out snow) may make the situations more
predictable and reduce the risk. Such technology improvements may help to
resolve one persistent issue pertaining to whether and when an avalanchemay
occur: information. ‘That’s what the population wants the most; they want
information’ (Interview 4).
Discussion
Turning to the expectations mentioned in the theoretical section, the ﬁrst
one proposes that the typical portfolio approach creates barriers to problem
solving. On the one hand, the data do indeed show how diﬀerent roles and
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responsibilities cause disagreements among public authorities about how to
sustain or enhance welfare and business conditions. The municipalities are
responsible for citizen and industry needs. In contrast, the Roads
Administration is responsible for keeping the roads safe. This manifests in
diﬀerent perceptions of solutions. For example, the municipalities claim that
announcing imminent road closures will be useful for citizens and enter-
prises. In contrast, the Roads Administration argues that this is not an
operational option, as the weather often changes quickly, and therefore
they would often be crying wolf if they tried to issue warnings. One weak-
ness of the silo system is that knowledge may be lost (or gained) when
tendering processes lead to changes of snow-clearing actors. The diﬀerence
of opinion demonstrates that organisational theory is important for under-
standing why the winter road closures present several dilemmas – in line
with Fimreite, Lægreid, and Rykkja (2014), who attribute deﬁciencies in crisis
management to organisational processes.
On the other hand, the evidence suggests that there are advantages to
working in silos. In some instances, the public authorities and emergency
services are content with silos (i.e., that another authority takes the decision
to close roads, so that evacuations are not hindered by tight budgets or fatal
road incidents): if it was up to the ambulance staﬀ, the driver would have
driven no matter what the road conditions were. The public departments
and services comply with ‘standard’ operating procedures (March and Olsen
1989) and – to some extent – they are content to do so.
The second expectation is about the improvements of public authority
preparedness and the adaptation via meta-governance. While meta-govern-
ance measures exist, such governance is to some extent lacking, due to lack
of requests from below and fear of unwanted interference from above. The
informants agree that better coordination across public sector actors and
levels may help to solve problems related to highway closures. They suggest
that this could be done by increasing county involvement. The county has
important regional planning, risk and vulnerability responsibilities as well as
being a public transport authority, but does not usually get involved in road
closure problems, unless they are contacted by the municipalities.
Referring to the involvement of higher levels via meta-governance, there
is already considerable policy guidance from the state to the municipal level
in Norway. The County Governor’s Oﬃce supervises and monitors municipal
plans and their implementation. However, the evidence suggests that there
is a lack of capacity at the municipal level. This result is in line with Rykkja
(2014, p. 136), who ﬁnds that most County Governor staﬀ believe that the
Norwegian proximity principle rarely functions in practice. In the present
context, in particular small municipalities lack key competence and staﬀ
capacity. The general impression is that the integration of preparedness
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planning and crisis management in the municipalities and the implementa-
tion thereof is deﬁcient, although improving.
Municipalities in Troms County have low scores in terms of fulﬁlling the
requirements for municipal contingency (Directorate of Civil Protection
2016). However, as mentioned under the ﬁrst expectation, the informants
themselves suggest that a higher administrative level – not the County
Governor’s Oﬃce (i.e., national) but the county (i.e., regional) – should
have more and clearer responsibilities. This could improve preparedness
and increase adaptation capacity, but only if the county assumes this
responsibility. This ﬁnding oﬀers some support to the optimistic perspective
in the natural hazards and climate adaptation literature that sees govern-
ance as helpful (Biesbroek et al. 2014).
The data support the proposition that improved governance contributes
to advanced preparedness and adaptation to winter climate-induced high-
way problems. However, governance is only a partial solution. Even with
improved governance, the evidence indicates that winter highway closure
challenges in northern Norway remain a problem that is so multifaceted that
there is no agreement about how to deﬁne and solve it (Rittel and Webber
1973). The ﬁndings also endorse a realist perspective that many societal
challenges are indeed ‘wicked’. Moreover, results partially conﬁrm a pessi-
mist perspective, that government contributions to solving such climate-
induced problems are minor or limited (Biesbroek et al. 2014).
This brings us back to the ﬁrst expectation. The evidence shows that the
organisational aspect is important for understanding why governance can only
partially resolve the winter climate-induced highway closure problems in
Troms. While an increased understanding for each other’s roles, for example
through improved communication, may settle disputes about how best to
improve societal welfare and business conditions, disagreements will persist
because of the diﬀerent ﬁelds of responsibility.
Other reasons for the limits of governance include the elemental forces.
In Troms, it is impossible to solve the problem of climate-induced highway
outages because there are no optimal solutions for such uncertainties
caused by natural forces (see Chapin et al. 2008). This conﬁrms the erratic
natural hazards as a challenged governance domain (Zurita et al. 2015).
Avalanche safeguarding is expensive and public resources for improvements
will always be limited, especially in sparsely populated regions.
The ﬁndings suggest that road improvement resources are limited,
despite sizeable livelihood interests in one of the study areas (e.g.,
large ﬁsh processing plants, service providers for the ﬁshing ﬂeet)
that depend on unrestricted access to roads. Even if several stretches
of highway near the study areas are protected by avalanche galleries,
snow sheds and tunnels, it seems unlikely that all winter highway
closures can be prevented on such roads that run alongside steep
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mountains exposed to blizzards and heavy snowfalls. Most avalanches
cannot be predicted. As such, exposed highways are usually closed
without any warning. In addition, polar low pressures that are diﬃcult
to forecast can bring sudden heavy snowfalls, underlining the impossi-
bility of advance hazard warnings.
In several mountainous vicinities, uncertainty may increase with climate
change. Even with improved avalanche safeguarding, avalanches can still
bury highway stretches in vulnerable locales. However, novel radar tracking
of avalanches combined with traﬃc lights and better distribution of updated
road information will make it easier to live with such natural hazards and
(possible) road closures. Even so, inhabitants and businesses may not always
welcome these warning systems, as they may prefer safer and open roads by
the construction of avalanche galleries, snow sheds and (improved) tunnels.
There is a tension between public demand for accessible roads and the
evaluations of risk of using those roads during diﬃcult winter conditions. The
lack of notiﬁcation of when road closure will happen creates frustration. As
mentioned, it is impossible to provide such information every time. What we
can learn from this case study is that clariﬁcation of the impossibility to give
advance notice could make the public more sympathetic to the authorities.
Conclusions
Public sector adaptation and preparedness to winter climate-induced road
closures generally function well, given the present road and winter main-
tenance standards. However, in asking whether and how discrepancies
between public authorities create barriers to public sector adaptation and
preparedness, we ﬁnd that working in silos aﬀects public authorities’ ability
to sustain welfare and business conditions when winter weather forces road
closures. Because public authorities, agencies and emergency services have
diﬀerent civil protection and emergency roles, their responsibilities some-
times clash. In most emergencies, there is little or no ﬂexibility to consider
particular interests or preferences (e.g., keeping a highway open until a
school bus or a freight delivery has passed), given the imminent avalanche
or blizzard risks. Additionally, diverse economic and social interests among
residents and businesses complicate the possibilities for resolving the issue
of winter road closures.
Under such circumstances, it is interesting to understand whether and
how governance may contribute to improve lifeline conditions. In studies of
climate adaptation and natural hazard preparedness, governance is com-
monly seen as a solution to climate-related perils and associated problems.
Our study provides only partial support to such an optimistic governance
perspective; the ﬁndings reveal limited coordination among the responsible
actors, conﬁrming natural hazards as a contested ﬁeld of governance. Yet
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the diﬀerent public departments and emergency services are also content to
have certain decisions made by other departments without their input,
arguing that not having to consider all kinds of considerations (e.g., econ-
omy and health) may help to prevent fatalities on the roads.
While improved governance may somewhat improve the welfare and
business conditions, unpredictable natural forces make sudden winter cli-
mate-induced highway closures in northern Norway a dilemma that cannot
be deﬁnitively resolved. Use of new or improved technology may only
partially mitigate the eﬀects of unpredictable natural forces, even in poten-
tial situations with considerable road investments, and increased coordina-
tion will not resolve all public sector issues related to winter climate-induced
highway closures in similar areas. In organisational terms, while improved
communication among public authorities may settle certain diﬀerences and
improve preparedness, some discrepancies will remain because of diﬀerent
areas of responsibilities.
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